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PAY NOW, FLY LATER: HEAD TAXES-A NEW
PHENOMENON IN AIRPORT FINANCE
The rapid growth of air travel has necessitated a corresponding
increase in expenditures for airport facilities throughout the United
States.' To help meet this need, Congress enacted the Airport and
Airway Development and Revenue Acts of 19702 for the "expansion
and improvement ' of the air transportation system. A trust fund was
created to finance federal participation in eligible airport projects.4
Prior to the enactment of the 1970 legislation, several states and one
local community attempted to finance construction, maintenance, and
operation of their airport facilities by levying charges on enplaning
airline passengers. 5 All but one of these fees were held unconstitutional
in the state courts.6 The Supreme Court reversed this trend, however,
in a 1972 landmark decision approving the imposition of such user
charges provided they bear a reasonable relationship to the use of the
airport facilities. 7 In reaction to the Court's ruling and to the subse-
quent burgeoning of various forms of local "head taxes,"8 Congress
I See BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DE'T OF COMmRCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrran STATES: 1971, at 415, 552-53, 555-56 (1971).
2 Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219 (codified in 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-27, 1741-42 (1970), and
in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954) [hereinafter cited as "1970
Act'].
3 49 U.S.C. § 1701 (1970). In its declaration of policy, Congress found "[t]hat the Na-
tion's airport and airway system is inadequate to meet the current and projected growth
in aviation" and "[t]hat substantial expansion and improvement of the airport and airway
system is required to meet the demands of interstate commerce, the postal service, and the
national defense." Id.
4 Id. § 1742. This section provides for the creation and operation of the Airport and
Airway Trust Fund. Section 1717 indicates the allowable federal share of project costs.
5 See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 422:43 (Supp. 1972); Act of March 10, 1969, ch. 281,
[1969] Mont. Laws 689-91; Act of Dec. 1, 1969, ch. 200, [1969] N.J. Laws 557-58; Evansville-
Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist., Ind., Ordinance 33, § 1, Feb. 26, 1968.
6 See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S.
707 (1972) (constitutional); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Joint City-County Airport Bd., 154
Mont. 352, 463 P.2d 470 (1970) (unconstitutional); Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. New Hamp-
shire Aeronautics Comm'n, 111 N.H. 5, 273 A.2d 676 (1971), prob. juris. noted, 404 U.S. 819
(1971), afJ'd 405 U.S. 707 (1972) (constitutional); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Sills, 110 N.J.
Super. 54, 264 A.2d 268 (Ch. 1970) (unconstitutional).
7 Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707,
716-17 (1972).
8 A distinction can be drawn between taxes and charges:
[A]irport charges are imposed by governmental airport sponsors in their proprietary
capacity, only on those who use the facilities provided, in amounts proportional to
their use, for the purpose of recouping the proprietors' costs. Taxes, on the other
hand, generally are levies imposed for the purpose of raising revenue for general
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
passed a bill entitled the Airport Development Acceleration Act, which
would have prohibited state taxation of airplane passengers and in-
creased the federal share of allowable project costs. The President, how-
ever, vetoed the measure after Congress had adjourned. 10 Since the veto,
additional communities have imposed passenger fees.", The nation's
airports face a financial crisis which mandates an examination of ap-
proaches designed to produce the increased resources necessary for an
adequate air transportation system.
I
THE 1970 ACT
The 1970 Act established various levels of federal assistance for
financing airport capital improvements, but provided that the federal
share may not exceed fifty percent for allowable project costs12 in any
approved airport development'13 project and may not exceed eighty-
governmental expenditure and in amounts not necessarily related to the actual use
of services or facilities provided.
Hearings on S. 2397, S. 3302, S. 3611, and S. 3755 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1972) (statement of J. Reilly, Execu-
tive Vice President, Airport Operators Council International) [hereinafter cited as 1972
Senate Hearings]. The term "head tax" apparently has been adopted as a shorthand form
for referring to air passenger user charges.
After the Supreme Court decision, a large number of communities enacted passenger
fees, ranging from $.50 to $3.00. See H.R. REP. No. 1279, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972); N.Y.
Times, Nov. 2, 1972, at 44, col. 1. As of February 6, 1973, 31 jurisdictions imposed head
taxes. See id., Feb. 6, 1973, at 61, col. 2.
9 S. 3755, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
10 N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
11 See id., Nov. 2, 1972, at 44, col. 1.
12 49 U.S.C. § 1717(a) (1970). For projects in
any State containing unappropriated and unreserved public lands and nontaxable
Indian lands (individual and tribal) exceeding 5 per centum of the total area of
all lands therein, the United States share under [§ 1717](a) shall be increased by
whichever is the smaller of the following percentages thereof: (1) 25 per centum,
or (2) a percentage equal to one-half of the percentage that the area of all such
lands in that State is of its total area.
Id. § 1717(b). The maximum federal share for projects in the Virgin Islands is 75%. Id. §
1717(c).
13 The 1970 Act defines "airport development" as
(A) any work involved in construction, improving, or repairing a public airport or
portion thereof, including the removal, lowering, relocation, and marking and
lighting of airport hazards, and including navigation aids used by aircraft landing
at, or taking off from, a public airport, and including safety equipment required
by rule or regulation for certification of the airport under [Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, § 612, 49 U.S.C. § 1432 (1970)], and (B) any acquisition of land or of any
interest therein, or of any easement through or other interest in airspace, includ-
ing land for future airport development, which is necessary to permit any such
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two percent for costs of landing aids in any such project.14 These pro-
grams are financed by the Airport and Airway Trust Fund,15 which
derives its resources from various user charges: (1) taxes on fuel used in
noncommercial aviation,16 (2) an eight percent passenger tax on the
amount paid for taxable transportation, 7 (3) a three dollar passenger
tax on the amount paid for an international journey commencing in
the United States,'8 (4) a five percent tax on the amount paid for do-
work or to remove or mitigate or prevent or limit the establishment of, airport
hazards.
49 U.S.C. § 1711(2) (1970).
There is a total minimum annual authorization of $280 million for airport develop-
ment grants. Id. §§ 1714(a)(1), (2). Airports served by aircraft certificated by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board are eligible for a minimum of $250 million for each fiscal year from 1971
until 1975 (id. § 1714(a)(1)), and airports served by segments of aviation other than certifi-
cated aircraft are eligible for a minimum of $30 million for each fiscal year from 1971 until
1975. Id. § 1714(a)(2). Included in this statutory scheme are airports in the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, as well as in the "several States." Id. §
1714(a). Long-term obligations, not to exceed $840 million, are also available, although
none can extend for more than three fiscal years or beyond June 80, 1975. Id. § 1714(b).
For the acquisition, creation, and improvement of air navigation facilities, full fed-
eral participation is available with a minimum annual authorization of $250 million. Id.
§ 1714(c). The annual appropriations are to be granted for each fiscal year from 1971 until
1975. id.
An "air navigation facility" is defined as
any facility used in, available for use in, or designed for use in, aid of air naviga-
tion, including landing areas, lights, any apparatus or equipment for disseminat-
ing weather information, for sigaling, for radio-directional finding, or for radio
or other electrical communication, and any other structure or mechanism having
a similar purpose for guiding or controlling flight in the air or the landing and
take-off of aircraft.
Id. § 1301(8).
14 Id. § 1717(d). These landing aids consist of "(I) land required for the installation
of approach light systems, (2) touchdown zone and centerline runway lighting, or (3) high
intensity runway lighting." Id.
15 Id. § 1742.
16 There is a seven-cent-per-gallon tax on aviation fuel (INT. REv. CoDn oF 1954 §§
4041(c), (d), added by 84 Stat. 1743 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CODE]), and on gasoline used
in aircraft. Id. § 4081. The gasoline tax consists of a four-cent-per-gallon manufacturers'
tax (id. § 4081(a)), and an added three-cent-per-gallon retailers' tax on gasoline used in
noncommercial aviation. Id. §§ 4041(c)(2), (3), added by 84 Stat. 237 (1970). Commercial
aviation not only is free from the seven-cent-per-gallon aviation fuel tax and the three-
cent-per-gallon retailers' tax (id. §§ 4041(c), (d)), but also is entitled to a refund of the
four-cent-per-gallon manufacturers' tax. Id. § 6421(a), added by 84 Stat. 241 (1970).
17 Id. § 4261(a), amended by 84 Stat. 238 (1970).
"Taxable transportation" is "transportation by air which begins . . . and ends in the
United States or in the 225-mile zone," and "that portion of such transportation which is
directly or indirectly from one port or station in the United States to another . . . but
only if such portion is not a part of uninterrupted international air transportation." Id.
§ 4262(a). The "225-mile zone" is that part of Canada and Mexico "not more than 225
miles from the nearest point in the continental United States." Id. § 4262(c)(2).
18 Id. § 4261(c), added by 84 Stat. 238 (1970).
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mestic air transportation of property,19 (5) an annual registration tax
on the use of civil aircraft,20 and (6) taxes on aircraft tires and tubes.21
Although the 1970 Act furnished increased federal support for
the development and improvement of municipal airport facilities, the
need for local funding remains. Operation and maintenance costs must
be borne by state and local governments. 22 Because the Airport De-
velopment Aid Program (ADAP), implemented by the 1970 Act,23 is
designed to promote only those capital improvements contributing to
passenger safety, certain projects-for example, airport public parking
facilities for passenger automobiles, and hangars and airport buildings,
except for those containing facilities or activities directly related to
the safety of persons at the airport-are ineligible for federal funds.24
Furthermore, numerous communities are unable to raise sufficient
funds to provide their share of project costs25 or to comply with federal
regulations for certification and security.26
19 Id. § 4271, added by 84 Stat. 239 (1970).
20 Id. § 4491(a), added by 84 Stat. 243 (1970). The fee is $25, plus an amount deter-
mined by the aircraft weight. Id.
21 Id. §§ 4071(a)(2), (8). The tax is five cents per pound on tires and ten cents per pound
on inner tubes for tires.
22 Hearings on HR. 2337, HR. 14847, and HR. 10326 Before the Subcomm. on
Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1972) (statement of J. Nammack, Executive Vice President,
National Association of State Aviation Officials) [hereinafter cited as 1972 House Hearings].
28 49 U.S.C. § 1714 (1970).
24 Id. § 1720(b). For a full description of allowable project costs, see id. § 1720(a).
25 1972 Senate Hearings 24 (statement of J. Shaffer, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA)). According to the testimony of Mr. Shaffer, approximately $200
million in airport sponsor requests for eligible projects were returned or withdrawn in fiscal
year 1971 because of inability to furnish the local share. Id. In' that year, $170 million were
obligated, which means that less than one-half of the applications were approved. Id. at
19. Non-hub; small hub, and general aviation facilities, rather than the larger airports,
have the most difficulty in raising their share of costs. Id. at 24. A list of 18 small com-
munities -having such problems was placed in the record. Id. at 23.
. " Since the inception of ADAP "approximately $215 million in requests have never
generated because of a lack of local funds." Id. at 30 (statement of C. Bowers, Director, FAA
Airport Services).
26 Id. at 108 (statement of G. Bean, Director, Hillsborough County Airport Authority,
Florida, Operator, Tampa International Airport, and President, American Association of
Airport Executives). This inability to produce matching funds has not affected the overall
operation of ADAP, however, since the FAA fully obligated the minimum amount of allo-
cated federal money for projects in fiscal year 1971. Id. at 19 (statement of J. Shaffer, Ad-
ministrator, FAA). Mr. Shaffer indicated that the FAA obligated "all but 4 cents of the
Airport Development Aid Program (ADAP) funds set at $170 million." Id. In fiscal year
1972, the FAA forecasts that it will obligate the entire $280 million allotted under ADAP.
Id. at 23 (statement of C. Bowers, Director, FAA Airport Services).
Only $170 million, rather than $280 million, was obligated for fiscal year 1971 because
[Vol. 58:759
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II
HEAD TAxES, ThE COURT, AND CONGRESS
In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta
Airlines, Inc.,27 and its companion case, Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. New
Hampshire Aeronautics Commission,28  the Supreme Court held that
the imposition of fees on enplaning passengers is a constitutionally
valid exercise of the states' power to tax,29 since there is no discrimina-
the Department of Transportation budget requests for fiscal 1971 were submitted
prior to enactment of the [1970 Act]. Accordingly, the Department first asked for
spending authority under the Act in a supplemental request. This request, trans-
mitted almost 6 months after the law was enacted, programmed only $100 million
for airport development, not the $280 million minimum specified in the Act. The
Department concurrently requested $226 million for air navigation facilities and
equipment (airways) rather than the $250 million minimum. The Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1971 increased appropriations for airports and airways to
amounts in excess of those requested to $170 million and $238 million, respec-
tively.
S. RE. No. 1005, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972).
By restricting its expenditures to the minimum level in order to accumulate a surplus
in the trust fund, the FAA has acquired a substantial backlog of funding applications.
The backlog for fiscal year 1973 is estimated at approximately $200 million. 1972 Senate
Hearings 19 (statement of J. Shaffer). An accumulation of surplus in the trust fund is ex-
pected. Id. at 29 (statement of C. Bowers). Beginning in fiscal year 1974, the trust fund will
have a surplus (id.), and by fiscal year 1975, it may contain as much as $1 billion that is
not obligated. Id. at 28 (statement of J. Shaffer). As Mr. Shaffer explained:
This surplus will result from maintaining today's level of commitments or obliga-
tions, against the growth in revenues from user charges due entirely to the expan-
sion of demand in the system, not rate charges. There will be more cargo shipped
through the system, more fuel burned, more passengers enplained [sic] and more
revenues earned and collected.
Id. at 31.
27 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
28 Id.
29 The Indiana ordinance, enacted by the Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority
District, levied a "use and service charge of One Dollar ($1.00) for each passenger enplan-
ing any commercial aircraft operated from the Dress Memorial Airport." Evansville-Vander-
burgh Airport Authority Dist., Ind., Ordinance 83, § 1, Feb. 26, 1968. Revenues col-
lected from these charges are kept by the Airport Authority
in a separate fund for the purpose of defraying the present and future costs in-
curred by said Airport Authority in the construction, improvement, equipment,
and maintenance of said Airport and its facilities for the continued use and fu-
ture enjoyment by all users thereof.
Id. § 5. Similarly, the New Hampshire statute provided for an enplaning passenger ser-
vice charge based on aircraft weight. N.H. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 422:43 (Supp. 1972). This
act permits the air carrier to collect the fees either directly or indirectly from each pas-
senger. Id. Fifty percent of the money is placed in the state's aeronautical fund. The re-
mainder is allocated "to the municipalities or the airport authorities owning the public
landing areas at which the fees ... were imposed." Id. Both the Indiana and New Hamp-
shire provisions apply to domestic and interstate travelers.
Delta, Eastern, and Allegheny Airlines succeeded in challenging the constitutionality
1973]
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tion against or undue burden on interstate commerce, no congressional
preemption of the field, no interference with the right to travel, and
no violation of equal protection.
A. The Commerce Clause
The Court denied that the fees in Evansville-Vanderburgh vio-
lated the commerce clause, 30 emphasizing that charges for the use of
airport facilities apply to interstate and intrastate passengers alike.31
Although superficially the decision appears to present an obstacle to
free movement among the states, in reality it is merely an extension of
the principles governing water, railroad, and highway carrier taxation
cases32 into the field of air transportation. In these land and water
cases, the Court applied the commerce clause to invalidate state levies
on interstate carriers only when it found that the taxes: (1) were im-
posed on the privilege of conducting an interstate business rather than
on the privilege of utilizing state-provided facilities, (2) discriminated
against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce, or (3) ex-
ceeded the amount that would be fair compensation to the state. 83 As
the Court maintained in Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 4 the tax
of the Indiana ordinance in the state courts. The Superior Court of Vanderburgh County,
Indiana, granted a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance, assert-
ing that the fees imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. See 405 U.S.
707, 709 (1972). This derision was affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court. 255 Ind. 436,
265 N.E.2d 27 (1970). The court maintained that "the tax . . . is not reasonably related
to the use of the facilities which benefit from the tax, and is, therefore, an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce in violation of [the commerce clause]." Id. at 443, 265
N.E.2d at 31. In New Hampshire, however, the airlines failed in their attempt to obtain
a declaratory judgment pronouncing the statute invalid. After transfer of the action from
the Superior Court of Merrimack County, New Hampshire, the state supreme court re-
versed, maintaining that the charge placed a minimal burden on the carrier (111 N.H.
5, 9, 273 A.2d 676, 679 (1971)), and expressly rejected the views expressed in the Indiana
Supreme Court opinion. Id. at 8, 273 A.2d at 678. The United States Supreme Court re-
versed the Indiana judgment and affirmed the New Hampshire judgment. 405 U.S. 707
(1972).
30 405 U.S. at 717.
81 Id.
32 See, e.g., Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950) (highway carrier);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (railroad); Helson v. Kentucky 279 U.S.
245 (1929) (water carrier).
83 Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 544 (1950).
The state can determine the amount of the fees and the means of collection provided
"they are reasonable and are fixed according to some uniform, fair and practical stan-
dard" which will not impose a burden on interstate commerce. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235
U.S. 610, 624 (1915) (citations omitted).
34 339 U.S. 542 (1950). In Brice, the Court upheld a Maryland toll of 2% on the fair
market value of vehicles utilized in interstate commerce, which supplemented the state
standard mileage charge.
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"should be judged by its result, not its formula, and must stand unless
proven to be unreasonable in amount for the privilege granted."85 The
fees upheld in Evansville-Vanderburgh are part of a natural evolution-
ary process, not a radical departure from precedent. None of the con-
ditions for invalidation enumerated in the earlier transportation cases
were met.
Originally, states were confined to taxing matters which would
not affect the other states.3 6 As various modes of transportation devel-
oped and states created facilities to accommodate this development, the
states acquired the authority to tax interstate carriers.3 7
Provision of adequate transportation facilities has consistently
been regarded as a matter for local regulation, despite the presence of
interstate commerce, since "police regulation of local aspects of inter-
state commerce is a power often essential to a State in safeguarding
vital local interests."3 8 In exercising its power over transportation facili-
ties, the state can require monetary compensation when "at its own
expense [it] furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in
commerce, interstate as well as domestic."3 9
B. Federal Preemption
The Evansville-Vanderburgh Court found that Congress had evi-
denced no intent to exclude "state and local power to levy charges
designed to help defray the costs of airport construction and mainte-
nance."40 The Court concluded that the 1970 Act manifested a con-
trary purpose by providing that
35 Id. at 545.
386 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
37 With respect to the extent and nature of the local interests to be protected and
the unavoidable effect upon interstate and intrastate commerce alike, regulations
of the use of the highways are akin to local regulation of rivers, harbors, piers
and docks, quarantine regulations, and game laws, which, Congress not acting,
have been sustained even though they materially interfere with interstate com-
merce.
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnvell Bros., Inc., 803 U.S. 177, 187-88 (1938)
(footnotes omitted). Highway taxes conforming to these criteria were upheld as valid
exercises of the states' police power. The general principle asserted in Freeman v. Hewit,
329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946), that "[s]tate taxation falling on interstate commerce ... can only
be justified as designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local
government whose protection it enjoys," also pertains to charges imposed on airport use.
38 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946). See also South Carolina State Highway
Dep't v. Barnvell Bros., Inc., 803 U.S. 177 (1938); Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 185 (1927);
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Hendrick v. Maryland, 285 U.S. 610 (1915); Trans-
portation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1882).
39 Hendrick v. Maryland, 285 U.S. 610, 624 (1915).
40 Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S.
1973]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [
[a]s a condition precedent to his approval of an air develop-
ment project, the Secretary [of Transportation] shall receive assur-
ances in writing, satisfactory to him, that... the airport operator
or owner will maintain a fee and rental structure for the facilities
and services being provided the airport users which wil make the
airport as self-sustaining as possible under the circumstances exist-
ing at that particular airport, taking into account such factors as
the volume of traffic and economy of collection....41
Despite the congressional mandate for federal user charges to support
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, this subsection reserves for public
and private airport proprietors the power to impose their own user
fees. The imposition of head taxes is a legitimate exercise of this power
and was held by the Supreme Court in Evansville-Vanderburgh not to
"conflict with any federal policies furthering uniform national regu-
lation of air transportation." 42
Within one week of the Evansville-Vanderburgh decision, during
Senate hearings on bills to amend the 1970 Act,48 members of Congress
asserted that Congress had intended to preempt the field.44 Shortly
thereafter, in an attempt to clarify this intention, both houses of Con-
gress focused on legislation which would ban air passenger fees while
increasing federal assistance under the 1970 Act.45 Whether Congress
707, 721 (1972). The 1970 Act contains no provision specifically prohibiting these owners
from instituting any type of fees, including passenger charges.
41 49 U.S.C. § 1718(8) (1970).
42 405 US. at 720-21.
48 The case was decided on April 19, 1972. On April 25-26, 1972, the Senate con-
ducted hearings on S. 2397, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which would amend the 1970 Act
by increasing the maximum federal share to 75% of allowable project costs except with
respect to landing aids, and on S. 3302, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), which would amend the
1970 Act by "making certain airports where the landing area is owned by the United
States or an agency thereof eligible for assistance." Portions of these bills were incorporated
into S. 3755, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), which was vetoed by President Nixon.
44 Senator Howard W. Cannon of Nevada, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
Aviation of the Committee on Commerce, stated: "Despite what the Supreme Court said,
I am sure it was the intention of this committee that we preempt the field." 1972 Senate
Hearings 98.
Expressing his dissatisfaction with the Evansville- Vanderburgh decision, Senator Mar-
low Cook of Kentucky foreshadowed future congressional action: "It looks to me like [the
Court] opened the barn door wide open.... That may require some legislative action on
our part in the future." Id. at 27.
45 The House "revived" H.R. 2337, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), originally introduced
on January 26, 1971, which would "amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to prohibit
State taxation of the carriage of persons in air transportation." On June 19 and 23, 1972,
hearings were conducted on H.R. 2337, as well as on H.R. 14847, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972),
on H.R. 10326, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), and on similar bills involving state taxation and
the federal share of funds to be used for airport construction, maintenance, and improve-
ments. Introduced on May 9, 1972, H.R. 14847 included provisions concerning the ban on
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intended to preclude the states from levying these charges in 1970 is
irrelevant. It clearly possessed the power to do so46 in 1972 and 1973.
In 1972, Congress attempted to accommodate state and national
interests by passing the Airport Development Acceleration bill.4 7 Al-
though this bill would have banned all air passenger charges with
two short term exceptions,48 it would have increased the federal share
in allowable project costs to a maximum of seventy-five percent for
medium hub, small hub, non-hub, and general aviation airports.4 9
Federal participation in financing the nation's large hubs would have
continued at the present level-not to exceed fifty percent. 0 Passage
of this legislation would have preempted the field. 1
head taxes and the increase in federal funding. The hearings centered around these pro-
visions of the bill.
On May 16, 1972, S. 3611, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), was introduced to amend the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 by banning charges on air passengers. In modified form,
this bill became part of S. 3755. Hearings on S. 3611 were held on June 12, 1972.
46 The development of an adequate air transportation system may be designated a
matter to be regulated solely by Congress. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946). As
the Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851), declared:
Whatever subjects of this power [to regulate commerce] are in their nature na-
tional, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be
said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.
According to a memorandum from the Senate Office of the Legislative Council to
Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, "Congress does
have authority to pre-empt State and local taxation of passengers engaged in air trans-
portation. The Court in the Evansville- Vanderburgh Airport case found a contrary pur-
pose to be evident in the [1970 Act], but if faced with a dear intent on the part of Con-
gre!s to pre-empt would agree to it." 1972 Senate Hearings 208.
47 S. 3755, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); see note 9 and accompanying text supra.
48 There were two narrowly drawn exceptions for all New Hampshire airports (S.
3755, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1113(a) (1972)), and for Bradenton-Sarasota Airport in Florida.
Id. §'1113(c). The exemptions were to continue until July 1973. For a discussion of the
reasons for these two temporary exemptions, see 118 CONG. REC. S 13,300-04- (daily ed. Aug.10, 1972).
"'49 S. 3755, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a)(2) (1972).
60 Id. § 5(a)(l). '
The 1972 bill would have increased the minimum annual authorization and the long
"tim obligational authority for airport development grants. Id. § 3. For fiscal years 1974
and 1975, minimum annual authorization for airport development grants to air carrier and
reliever airports would have been increased from $250 million to $312.5 million per year.
Id. § 3(a). The authority to incur obligations to make airport development grants would
have been increased from $840 million to $1.54 billion, and extended until 1975. Id. § 3(b).
The bill further provided that the federal share could not exceed 82% of that portion
of allowable project costs for safety equipment required for airport certification and for
security equipment required by regulation by the Secretary of Transportation. Id. § 5(e).
Under the 1970 Act, such costs are governed by the general provision for a maximum of
50% federal participation. 49 U.S.C. § 1717(a) (1970).
51 The President, in vetoing the entire measure, noted that it was a "breach [of] the
budget." N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1972, at 1, col. 1. The bill was sent from Congress to the
White House on October 13, 1972. Id. It was vetoed on October 27, 1972. Id.
1973]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
C. The Right To Travel and Equal Protection
State and local governmental imposition of head taxes does not
impinge upon the right to interstate travel.5 2 Although it is of in-
definite origin,5 3 this right is today firmly entrenched and can be
abridged only where there is "a compelling governmental interest."54
The Evansville-Vanderburgh Court asserted that publicly provided
airport facilities assist rather than obstruct interstate travel.55 States
benefit both interstate and intrastate travelers by providing adequate
airports through a reasonable and nondiscriminatory tax. The right to
unhampered travel, whatever its constitutional basis, is not abridged
by this type of state action.
As a service charge related to the use of airport facilities, air pas-
senger fees are distinguishable from the capitation tax struck down in
Crandall v. Nevada.5 The tax imposed in that case5" was held uncon-
52 This right was recognized as early as 1849 by Mr. Chief Justice Taney: "We are
all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the
right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our
own States." Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
5 The right to travel has not been linked definitely to any specific clause of the Con-
stitution, and was described recently as a "nebulous judicial construct." Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 216 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). At various
times its foundation has been recognized in the commerce clause (see United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)), the privileges and immunities of national citizenship clause
(see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 281 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part)), and the fourteenth amendment. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
In several cases the Court has pointed out that this right has no definite source. See Oregon
v. Mitchell, supra, at 229 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
54 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
55 Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S.
707, 714 (1972).
56 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
57 In 1865, the Nevada legislature imposed a one dollar capitation tax on "'every
person leaving the State by any railroad, stage coach, or other vehicle engaged or em-
ployed in the business of transporting passengers for hire."' Id. at 36. Those engaged in
such business must pay the tax for each "person so conveyed or transported from the
State." Id. The lone dissenter in Evansville-Vanderburgh, Mr. Justice Douglas, argued
that Crandall must be overruled if the air carrier taxes were to be upheld. 405 U.S. at 722.
Emphasizing that a charge on passengers substantially interfered with the fundamental
constitutional right to interstate travel, he rejected the notion that such exactions were
designed as compensation for the use of airport facilities. Id. at 726. He declared:
Heretofore, we have held that a tax imposed on a carrier but measured by
the number of passengers is no different from a direct exaction upon the pas-
sengers themselves, whether or not the carrier is authorized to collect the tax
from the passengers.
Id. at 725. Mr. Justice Douglas has consistently upheld the right to travel. See Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 519 (1964) (Douglas, J, concurring); Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226, 250, 255 (1964); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 12 (1959) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Similar sentiment had been expressed in several state court decisions prior to the
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stitutional as a direct charge on the passenger "for the privilege of leav-
ing the State, or passing through it by the ordinary mode of passenger
travel."58 In its analysis, the Crandall Court refused to "concede that
the question... [should] be determined by the [Commerce Clause]."5 9
Supreme Court's approval of air fees. The state courts in Montana, New Jersey, and In-
diana held that passenger charges were unconstitutional; the New Hampshire court, how-
ever, found otherwise. See note 6 supra.
Discussing the fundamental right of the "free movement of persons," the Montana
Supreme Court said:
Unlike the movement of goods, where a balance often is struck (in the absence
of federal legislation) between the Commerce Clause's demand for untrammeled
commercial intercourse, and the states' needs for reasonable police regulation and
revenue collection, the constitutional protection is treated as absolute.
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Joint City-County Airport Bd., 154 Mont. 352, 357, 463 P.2d
470, 473 (1970). The ban on state exaction of head taxes must be absolute. Id. Furthermore,
the court maintained that the fees cannot be regarded as user charges because "the im-
position of a charge based on the number of emplaning passengers bears no reasonable
relationship to use of the airport facilities by the carrier." Id. at 360, 463 P.2d at 475. As
in Crandall v. Nevada, the Montana act violated the right to interstate travel by imposing
an exaction on the "act of emplanement, which is equivalent to the act of departure and
therefore is an integral aspect of interstate travel." Id. at 356, 463 P.2d at 473.
The New Jersey Superior Court expressly adopted the Montana court's reasoning.
Fees on enplaning passengers "cannot be justified as service charges for the use of munici-
pal facilities or the furnishing of municipal services. Nor can these amounts be justified
as a tax on interstate commerce." Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Sills, 110 N.J. Super. 54, 58,
264 A.2d 268, 270 (Ch. 1970). The court characterized the New Jersey statute as "nothing
but a modem version" of the act in Crandall v. Nevada which was held "an unlawful
attempt to interfere with the constitutional right of citizens to travel freely." Id.
Congressional reaction to Evansville-Vanderburgh was similar. The Senate reported
that "[t]he head tax ... cuts against the grain of the traditional American right to travel
among the States unburdened by travel taxes." S. REP. No. 1005, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21
(1972). Throughout the hearings, senators and representatives referred to the state and
local fees as "head taxes," while designating the federal fees as "user charges." The tone
of the hearings indicates that Congress regarded the head taxes as a direct exaction on
the passenger, constituting infringement of the right to interstate travel. See, e.g., 1972
Senate Hearings 42 (remarks of Senator M. Cook); id. at 77, 98 (remarks of Senator H.
Cannon).
58 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 40.
59 Id. at 43. Despite the Crandall Court's refusal to base its decision on the com-
merce clause, it is arguable that the Nevada tax violated this constitutional provision as
it was interpreted in 1867. The Crandall Court stated:
It may be that under the power to regulate commerce among the States, Con-
gress has authority to pass laws, the operation of which would be inconsistent
with the tax imposed by the State of Nevada, but we know of no such statute now
in existence. Inasmuch, therefore, as the tax does not itself institute any regula-
tion of commerce of a national character, or which has a uniform operation over
the whole country, it is not easy to maintain, in view of the principles on which
those cases were decided, that it violates the [commerce clause].
Id.
In a separate opinion, Mr. Justice Clifford agreed that the statute was unconstitutional,
but preferred to base his decision on the commerce clause. He maintained:
[he act of the State legislature is inconsistent with the power conferred upon
Congress to regulate commerce among the several States, and I think the judgment
of the court should have been placed exclusively upon that ground. Strong doubts
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It grounded its decision on the notion that all persons have the right
to travel "to the seat of government" and that the states cannot "impede
or embarrass the constitutional operations of that government, or the
rights which its citizens hold under it."60 Unlike the charges in Evans-
ville-Vanderburgh, the Crandall capitation tax bore no reasonable
relationship to state-provided highways or other facilities.61 Addition-
ally, the tax discriminated against interstate travel because it operated
only on those who were leaving or passing through the state.62 Such an
exaction would violate the commerce clause as it is interpreted today.68
Nevertheless, whatever conceptual framework is applied to the Cran-
dall case, the capitation tax (unlike the present air passenger head
tax) clearly constituted an infringement on the right to interstate travel.
A related difficulty recognized by the Evansville-Vanderburgh
Court is the possibility that air passenger user charges violate the equal
protection clause. 64 Statutory classification of those subject to the fees
must not operate as an invidious discrimination, but must have a
rational basis.65 Furthermore, a fair enactment administered in an
unequal manner denies the equal justice required by this clause of
the Constitution.66 Although the acts in Evansville-Vanderburgh apply
equally to domestic and interstate travelers, they also exempt a number
of passengers from paying the charges.0 7 Nonpassenger users are also
excepted. The Court held that this is not an unreasonable classification:
are entertained by me whether Congress possesses the power to levy any such tax,
but whether so or not, I am clear that the State legislature cannot impose any
such burden upon commerce among the several States. Such commerce is secured
against such legislation in the States by the Constitution, irrespective of any
Congressional action.
Id. at 49.
go Id. at 44-45.
[The citizen] has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim
he may have upon that government, or to transact any business he may have with
it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its func-
tions. Ie has a right to free access to its sea-ports, through which all the opera-
tions of foreign trade and commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land
offices, the revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several States, and this
right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must
pass in the exercise of it.
Id. at 44.
61 Id. at 40. The tax was not levied as a service charge, but as a charge for the privilege
of leaving or traveling through the state. Id.
62 Intrastate travelers were not subject to the tax. Id.
63 See notes 84-39 and accompanying text supra.
64 405 U.S. at 719 n.18.
65 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
66 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
67 Deplaning commercial passengers and passengers on noncommercial flights are not
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Certainly passengers as a class may be distinguished from other air-
port users, if only because the boarding of flights requires the use
of runways and navigational facilities not occasioned by nonflight
activities. Furthermore, business users, like shops, restaurants, and
private parking concessions do contribute to airport upkeep
through rent, a cost that is passed on in part at least to their
patrons.68
Although the fee falls on only enplaning passengers, there is no viola-
tion of the equal protection clause.6 9 The presence of other tax for-
mulas is irrelevant"0 when, as in this case, the existing statutes provide
a rational system of classification.
III
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The validity of air passenger fees rests on firm precedent. Policy
considerations, however, may dictate an unfavorable response to their
imposition. The essential issue is whether these state-imposed taxes are
an appropriate means of financing municipal facilities.
As more governmental airport proprietors apply their own distinct
variety of passenger service charges, there is an increased likelihood
subject to the fee. The Indiana ordinance specifically exempts active members of the
military and temporary layovers. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist., Ind.,
Ordinance 33, § 4, Feb. 6, 1968. However, there is no such provision in the New Hampshire
act. In addition, New Hampshire does not impose a charge on nonscheduled flights on
airplanes weighing less than 12,500 pounds, but does place a one dollar fee on heavier air-
craft. N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 422:44 (Supp. 1972). Indiana does not distinguish between
scheduled and nonscheduled commercial flights.
68 405 U.S. at 718. In addition, the distinction between commercial and noncommer-
cial flights reflects a reasonable categorization. Commercial flights need "more elaborate
navigation and terminal facilities, as well as longer and more costly runway systems, than
do flights by smaller private planes." Id. (footnote omitted).
The Court indicated that it is fair for commercial aviation to assume "a larger share
of the cost of facilities built primarily to meet its special needs, whether that additional
charge is levied on a per-flight basis in the form of higher takeoff and landing fees, or as
a toll per passenger-use in the form of a boarding fee." Id. at 719.
69 A charge on enplaning passengers is not an irrational "measure of the relative use
of the facilities for whose benefit they are levied." Id. The Court asserted that "[qt is not
unreasonable to presume that passengers enplaning at an airport also deplane at the same
airport approximately the same number of times." Id.
7o No tax is absolutely precise:
At least so long as the toll is based on some fair approximation of use or privilege
for use.., and is neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor excessive
in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred, it will pass constitutional
muster, even though some other formula might reflect more exactly the relative
use of the state facilities by individual users.
Id. at 716-17.
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that air transportation will be subject to multiple taxation.7 A plethora
of dissimilar statutes, taxing the same incident of commerce, would
unreasonably burden interstate commerce. Without uniformity, vary-
ing statutory schemes for head taxes would engender multiple taxation
in at least two ways: (1) when one airport charged enplaning passengers
while another charged enplaning and deplaning passengers,72 and (2)
when each airport en route charged passengers who used connecting
air service.73
Fear of burdensome exactions interfering with movement among
the states was manifested in Crandall v. Nevada:
[I]f the State can tax a railroad passenger one dollar, it can tax him
one thousand dollars. If one State can do this, so can every other
State. And thus one or more States covering the only practicable
routes of travel from the east to the west, or from the north to the
south, may totally prevent or seriously burden all transportation of
passengers from one part of the country to the other.74
71 In Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938), the Supreme
Court indicated that local taxes measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce
could be imposed by every state which that commerce touched. Apportionment of the tax
to the amount of commerce conducted within the state was regarded as an acceptable solu-
tion to the problem. Accord, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (unapportioned personal property tax on fleet of airplanes
operated in interstate commerce upheld).
An analogous situation exists in the area of passenger fees although a system of ap-
portionment has not yet been proposed.
72 Such a situation existed among the Philadelphia, Richmond, and Allentown air-
ports. Serving these three cities, Altair Airlines, Inc., was confronted with the following
circumstances at the time of the congressional hearings: (1) Philadelphia was about to
impose a $2.00 enplaning and $2.00 deplaning fee, effective July 1, 1972, (2) Richmond
would impose a $1.00 enplaning fee at the same time, and (3) Allentown had proposed a
$2.00 enplaning fee. Consequently, the round-trip passenger would pay a total of $6.00 in
traveling between Philadelphia and Allentown and a total of $5.00 in traveling between
Philadelphia and Richmond. 1972 House Hearings 163 (statement of T. Colket, Jr., Presi-
dent, Altair Airlines, Inc.).
Imposition of the Philadelphia "two-way" charge caused considerable controversy. See
S. REP. No. 1005, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-23 (1972) (Philadelphia newspaper artides).
Throughout the congressional hearings, the Philadelphia fee was the target of criticism.
See, e.g., 1972 House Hearings 146 (remarks of Representative J. Harvey). Philadelphia
subsequently eliminated this multiple taxation situation in favor of a $3.00 enplanement
charge.
73 1972 Senate Hearings 137 (statement of W. Gillilland, Vice Chairman, Civil Aero-
nautics Board). Mr. Gillilland explained:
[I]t appears that head taxes can be constitutionally imposed which would double
penalize those passengers in our smaller cities who must use connecting air service
to reach their destination. Such passengers might have to pay the tax each time
they enplane, forcing double or treble taxes while their big city cousins would
pay only once.
Id.
74 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 46 (1867).
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More than one hundred years later, recognizing the potential dangers
of multiple taxation on aircraft passengers, the Montana Supreme
Court observed:
If the state is empowered to tax the act of departure no inherent
limits exist as to the amount of charge. The right of the airport
to tax the act of enplanement cannot logically be distinguished
from the right of the airport to tax the act of deplanement. By the
same token, arrival and departure taxes could be levied by airports
at each point of intermediate stopover or transfer on a passenger's
route. Since no rational basis exists for apportioning the right to
tax arrival and departure among the various airports through
which a traveler might pass, there is nothing to prevent the accu-
mulation of crippling burdens on interstate air travel. Clearly the
power to tax the act of departure, even where the exaction is small,
encompasses the power to prohibit departure completely and to
impose crippling cumulative burdens on interstate travel.5
Although it inaccurately compared the air passenger user charge to
the capitation tax in Crandall, the Montana court did illustrate the
dangers of multiple taxation.
Head taxes pose other difficulties for air passengers. First, multiple
taxation is a problem not only among state and local governmental
airport proprietors, but also between those proprietors and the federal
government. Because the 1970 Act imposed federal excise taxes on
passengers, head tax critics contend that additional local and state
charges are "burdensome and discriminatory," 76 as well as federally
preempted.7 7 Second, flat rate air passenger fees are basically regres-
sive.78 When such charges are applied to small air fares, there is a sub-
stantial percentage increase in the fare.79 As a result, the short haul air
passenger who formerly enjoyed relatively inexpensive rates may seek
other forms of transportation. The development of feeder service into
large airports and commuter service between small communities may
75 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Joint City-County Airport Bd., 154 Mont. 352, 356-57,
463 P-2d 470, 473 (1970); see notes 6 & 57 and accompanying text supra.
76 See 1972 Senate Hearings 229 (letter from the Transportation Association of Amer-
ica to Senator Cannon, Chairman, Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce):
[C]ommercial airline users are paying over 90% of the revenues going into the
[Airport and Airway Trust Fund] .... Additional state and local taxes on them
would be burdensome and discriminatory. Let us use the funds we now have and
can expect under present programs before permitting additional finandal burden
on our commercial air travelers.
77 See notes 40-51 and accompanying text supra.
78 1972 Senate Hearings 175 (statement of R. Sorlien, Vice President, Altair Airlines,
Inc.).
79 Id. See also id. at 177 (analysis of effect of head tax on fare structure of Altair Air-
lines, Inc.).
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thus be inhibited.80 Multiple exactions on passengers using feeder air-
lines also may tend to discourage their continued use.81 Third, the col-
lection of head taxes entails delay for passengers 2 and administrative
expense for the airlines.83 Lack of uniformity in the amount and
method of collection may cause chaos and discourage business travel-
ers.84 Fourth, the imposition of air passenger charges may have further
adverse effects on the development of air transportation by discourag-
ing the use of airports having such fees85 and by reducing air travel
between cities where railroad service is competitive.86 And fifth, the
entire community economic structure may suffer in municipalities ex-
acting service charges. Corporations and associations will avoid using
those cities as the sites for meetings or conventions.87 Corporations also
will avoid locating businesses in areas with high transportation costs. 88
Because of the current financial crisis confronting municipal air-
ports, there are equally strong policy reasons for maintaining the local
head tax as a revenue source for airport costs. Although the 1970 Act
provided for fifty percent federal participation in capital improvement
projects, the actual total contribution to the public airport system is
only twenty-five to thirty percent.8 9 State and local airport owners must
provide one hundred percent of the costs of maintenance and opera-
80 Id. at 176-77 (statement of T. Colket, Jr., President Altair Airlines, Inc.).
81 Id. at 216 (statement of T. Keesling, President, American Society of Travel Agents,
Inc.).
82 Id. at 164 (statement of S. Tipton, President, Air Transport Association of Amer-
ica). For example, in Mobile, Alabama, it required 45 seconds per passenger for the air-
lines to complete the collection procedures. This delay angered passengers. Id.
88 Id. at 170. Administration of head taxes places considerable burden on the airlines:
In addition to the problem of dealing with increasing numbers of irate passengers,
airlines are concerned with the difficult and costly burden of administration and
accounting for such taxes. Though we don't know precisely what these costs would
be, we anticipate that the cost of administration to the airline may, in some cases,
exceed $1 per passenger.
Id.
84 Id. at 195 (statement of E. Halenza, President, National Passenger Traffic Associa-
tion).
85 Id. at 195-96.
86 Id. at 196.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 1972 House Hearings 88 (statement of J. Namnack, Executive Vice President,
National Association of State Aviation Officials). During the Senate hearings, Senator Can-
non observed:
I don't think there is any airport in the country that has been a 50-50 partner in
terms of financing, because there are so many things that do not qualify under the
act for assistance. ...
So I would say that if you have got Federal assistance to the extent of 25
per cent of your total capital plan, that is probably a pretty good figure.
1972 Senate Hearings 114.
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tion,9 0 as well as one hundred percent capitalization for terminal areas,
hangars, and parking facilities.91 Furthermore, numerous airports, par-
ticularly small hub and general aviation facilities, are precluded from
participating in the program because they are unable to raise the
requisite matching funds.92
Since state and local governments remain the primary financial
contributors to airport development,98 alternative methods of funding
are needed.94 Even with the proposed increase in the federal share to
seventy-five percent of capital improvement costs, it is not clear that
the financial pressures would be eased sufficiently95 or that head taxes
would be unnecessary.90
90 1972 Senate Hearings 114.
Originally, the 1970 Act provided that operation and maintenance costs for air navi-
gation facilities could be financed from money remaining in the trust fund after the
minimum authorizations had been met; however, in 1971, Congress eliminated this pro-
vision from the 1970 Act. Act of Nov. 27, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-174, § 2, 85 Stat. 491,
amending 49 U.S.C. § 1714(d) (1970). Congress clarified its intention that the trust fund be
used for "priority modernization" of the aviation network through capital improvements.
H.R. REP. No. 459, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1971).
91 See 1972 House Hearings 88 (statement of J. Nammack, Executive Vice President,
National Association of State Aviation Officials).
92 Small hub airports, with only token airline service, and general aviation air-
ports with no airline traffic, are at a tremendous disadvantage in revenues pro-
duced compared to busy air carrier airports where the airlines contribute hundreds
of thousands of dollars each year. The smaller airports simply do not have the
budget capability of providing large amounts of matching funds for capital
improvements.
1972 Senate Hearings 116 (statement of H. Manget, Jr., Manager, DeKalb-Peachtree Air-
port, Atlanta, Ga., and Director, American Association of Airport Executives).
93 Id. at 180 (statement of J. Nammack, Executive Vice-President, National Associa-
tion of State Aviation Officials).
94 "[Ihe States and local sponsors are without adequate revenue sources to provide
matching funds for airport development while sustaining the full costs of operating and
maintaining their airports." Id. at 179. During the first 18 months of ADAP, airport
sponsors were either unable to submit or subsequently withdrew project applications with
a combined value of approximately $500 million. Id.
95 1972 House Hearings 88 (statement of J. Nammack, Executive Vice President,
National Association of State Aviation Officials). The Airport and Airway Trust Fund can-
not solve the severe financial problems:
Despite the substantial impetus given to airport development during the past
two years by the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, financial assistance
provided by the Act has not been sufficient and will not be sufficient to satisfy
the urgent need for additional airport capacity and facilities. Increasing the level
of Federal participation beyond 50 percent will ease, but will not erase, the
financial deficiencies of airport sponsors.
Id.
09 Inquiries concerning airport financing were sent to officials connected with each
airport levying passenger service charges as of October 26, 1972 (one day prior to the
presidential veto of the 1972 bill). The following is a sample of responses to a question
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The two basic sources for funds are (1) the municipalities and
(2) the airlines and other airport users. The majority of commercial
airports operate at a deficit, with local governments raising revenues
through ad valorem taxes on property in the county in which the air-
port is located.97 Although communities derive benefit from the air-
ports in the form of increased employment and stimulated local busi-
ness 8 in many cases property owners are subject to an unfair tax
burden, since a large proportion of the actual airport users reside out-
side the county and contribute nothing toward the operation and main-
tenance of the airport facilities.99 Because of statutory limitations on
about the effect of the increase in federal participation and the possible continued need
for head taxes,
An increase of 25% in Federal Air projects, unquestionably, would be quite help-
ful to the [Dress Memorial] Airport in financing capital improvements. However,
no aid has yet been made available for additions to the terminal building for great
maintenance expenses which all airports incur in connection with their facilities,
and other related expenses. Thus, the increase of ADAP aid would not assist the
municipalities in this particular area.
Letter from Howard P. Trockman, attorney for Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority
District, to the author, Nov. 6, 1972 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
Congress only reduced the problem of local matching funds. They did not solve
it. There is a need for local matching funds to be derived from airport tax reve-
nues .... Therefore, the head tax [at Raleigh-Durham Airport] would probably
be continued, though reduced in amount, even with the 75% Federal participation,
provided it remains legal for this tax to be collected.
Letter from Henry E. Boyd, Jr., Airport Manager, Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority, to
the author, Nov. 1, 1972 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
The proposed 75% federal aid will not eliminate the need for the head tax.
The tax is required to fund [the] recent improvement program [at-R. E. Byrd
International Airport in Richmond, Virginia] and not all of our future needs
will be eligible for the grants, even if Congress appropriates sufficient funds for
all eligible projects.
Letter from Hon. T. Bliley, Jr., Mayor of Richmond, Va., to the author, Nov. 3, 1972 (on
file at the Cornell Law Review).
97 1972 House Hearings 194 (statement of H. Trockman, attorney for Evansville-Van-
derburgh Airport Authority). This was the method used by Evansville until the Supreme
Court sanctioned head taxes.
98 Id. at 70 (statement of S. Tipton, President, Air Transport Association of America).
99 For example, in Evansville, 40% of those using the airport facilities reside outside
the county. Id. at 194 (statement of H. Trockman, attorney for Evansville-Vanderburgh
Airport Authority).
A similar situation exists at the Rochester-Monroe County Airport in New York
State, where only 15% of the people of Monroe County use the airport facilities. Tele-
phone conversation with Lucien Morin, Rochester-Monroe County Airport Manager,
Nov. 3, 1972.
This disproportion also exists at R.E. Byrd International Airport in Richmond,
Virginia:
Cities as regional hubs cannot deny these services, despite the fact that re-
turns to cities are often disproportionate to the larger sums which we must spend
for airport development, operation, and maintenance. Airport facilities are prime
examples of municipal services with regional benefit. It is unreasonable and un-
fair to expect taxpayers of jurisdictions which own and operate airports, like my
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property taxes 00 and the competition of other public projects for local
funding,101 municipalities are generally unable to raise adequate
revenue.
Revenue-raising capacity is limited, either legally or practically.
City property taxes have approached or reached maximum legal
limits imposed by state law or constitutions, or else are caught in a
squeeze with rising property taxes levied by independent school
districts. Sales tax and income tax powers must be granted by state
[sic], usually with restrictive ceilings imposed by the state upon the
city. 02
The second source of funds is the airlines and other airport
users. 0 3 Landing fees based on aircraft tonnage are a primary funding
measure; however, in many cases these are not fully compensatory104
Having negotiated long term, unchangeable landing fee contracts with
city of Richmond, to pay for new, expanded, and improved facilities when the
beneficiaries of airports are not paying their fair share of the costs.
1972 House Hearings 96 (statement of Hon. T. Bliley, Jr., Mayor of Richmond, Va.).
100 See, e.g., N.C. CoNsr. art. V, § 4(2). This provision has restricted the ability to
raise funds at the Raleigh-Durham Airport in North Carolina:
This airport has been developed, expanded and maintained to date without
the use of local ad valorem tax money; the use of such money without a vote of
the people is prohibited by our constitution; and the voters of the tvo countries
[sic] supporting the airport have indicated in a vote on a General Obligation
Bond Rederendum that they believe the airport user should provide the money
for the development of the airport.
1972 House Hearings 172 (letter from H. Boyd, Jr., Airport Manager, Raleigh-Durham
Airport Authority, N.C., to Representative Jarman, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Trans-
portation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Commerce, June 2, 1972).
The Bradenton-Sarasota Airport in Florida "has no real property taxing authority,
and the only source of money it has to repay the cost of those facilities is the head tax
itself." 118 CONG. RiEC. S 13,302 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1972) (remarks of Senator Chiles).
101 1972 House Hearings 97 (statement of Hon. T. Bliley, Jr., Mayor of Richmond,
Va.).
102 Id. Airports may also be financed from general revenues or by general obligation
bonds. Id.; see 1972 Senate Hearings 116 (statement of H. Manget, Jr., Manager, DeKalb-
Peachtree Airport, Atlanta, Ga., and Director, American Association of Airport Executives).
Several airports, however, have no bonding powers, e.g., Lebanon Regional Airport Au-
thority in New Hampshire and Raleigh-Durham Airport in North Carolina. See id. at
228 (letter from R. Poland, Jr., Chairman, Lebanon Regional Airport Authority, N.H., to
Senator Cotton, June 12, 1972).
103 Raleigh-Durham Airport, for example, proposed to finance its improvements by,
inter alia, revenue bonds. One type would be supported by passenger airport use fees, air-
craft landing fees, and fixed base operation revenues. The other type would be supported
by rentals from terminal buildings, the terminal area, and warehouse and other building
rentals. See 1972 House Hearings 174 (statement of H. Boyd, Jr., Airport Manager, Raleigh-
Durham Airport Authority, N.C.).
104 Telephone conversation with J. Corbett, Vice President of Federal Affairs, Airport
Operators Council International, Inc., Nov. 6, 1972.
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airport sponsors, airlines refuse to pay increased fee rates.10 5 To supple-
ment landing fees, other financial resources are available: (1) charges
for operation of parking facilities;10 6 (2) space rentals by concession-
aires, such as gift shops and restaurants, within the airport complex;107
(3) airline rentals of office and ticket counterspace; 08 (4) "fuel thru-put"
charges or gasoline taxes; 10 9 (5) annual field permits for general aviation
aircraft;"10 and (6) tie-down fees for keeping aircraft in place."' Any
combination of these charges may be imposed by airport sponsors, but
they, too, are usually inadequate.
State governments furnish "only 2-3% of total airport system
costs.""112 Airlines are subject to several forms of state taxation, includ-
ing general corporation and income taxes," 3 ad valorem property
105 1972 House Hearings 113 (statement of J. Corbett, Vice President of Federal Affairs,
Airport Operators Council International, Inc.).
Imposition of head taxes is related to the insufficiency of landing fees:
The airlines in any event say that their 30-year contracts cannot be changed. That
is one of the reasons for not obtaining compensatory fees. If the airport is charg-
ing a fully compensatory landing fee, it has no basis for imposing another charge
directly on the passenger. If an airport is self-sufficient and has a reasonable re-
serve for future development, he [sic] has no basis for imposing a "head tax."
Id.
Inability to bargain effectively with the airlines has been a major obstacle to obtain-
ing compensatory landing fees. Letter from J.E. Mitchell, Jr., Executive Director, Hunts-
ville-Madison County Airport Authority, Ala., to the author, Nov. 6, 1972; Letter from
William H. Grigham, Senior Assistant City Attorney for Mobile, Ala., to the author, Nov.
3, 1972; Letter from Henry E. Boyd, Jr., Airport Manager, Raleigh-Durham Airport Au-
thority, N.C., to the author, Nov. 1, 1972 (all on file at the Cornell Law Review).
106 Telephone conversation with Lucien Morin, Manager, Rochester-Monroe County
Airport, Nov. 3, 1972. At Rochester-Monroe County Airport, private firms submit contract
bids for the operation of parking facilities which accommodate airport users for either
short- or long-term parking. Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.; telephone conversation with J. Corbett, Vice President of Federal Affairs,
Airport Operators Council International, Inc., Nov. 6, 1972. Labelling the gasoline tax as
a "fuel thru-put charge," Mr. Corbett explained that it is levied on general aviation in
lieu of landing fees. The fixed-wing base operator who sells the gasoline must pay the tax.
At Rochester-Monroe County Airport, the fixed-wing base operator is charged two
cents per gallon for gasoline sold to the airlines and this revenue is remitted to the local
government. Telephone conversation with Lucien Morin, Manager Rochester-Monroe
County Airport, Nov. 3, 1972.
111 Telephone conversation with Lucien Morin, Manager, Rochester-Monroe County
Airport, Nov. 3, 1972.
112 S. REP. No. 1005, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972); see 1972 House Hearings 105 (state-
ment of J. Corbett, Vice President of Federal Affairs, Airport Operators Council Interna-
tional, Inc.).
113 See Ternes, Aviation Taxation, 25 MicH. ST. B.J. 23 (1946).
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taxes,114 and gasoline taxes.P"5 Because these taxes are part of the states'
general funds, a large percentage does not return directly to the air-
ports.
IV
FORECAST FOR ThE FUTURE
Despite the President's recent veto of the Airport Development
Acceleration Act of 1972, Congress will probably re-enact substantially
the same form of legislation in the near future.1 6 In the absence of
congressional action, the courts must serve as "final arbiters""17 in
114 The Supreme Court has upheld an apportioned ad valorem tax on the flight.
equipment of an interstate air carrier (see Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equali-
zation and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954)), and an unapportioned personal property tax
on a fleet of airplanes operated in interstate commerce. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minne-
sota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944). See Brabson, Multistate Taxation of the Transportation Industry,
18 Omo Sr. L.J. 22 (1957); Powell, Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota: State Taxation of
Airplanes, 57 HARv. L REv. 1097 (1944); Snell, Northwest Airlines Revisited, 83 TAXEES 659
(1955); Sutherland & Vinciguerra, The Octroi and the Airplane, 82 CoRNmL L.Q. 161
(1946); Comment, State Taxation of International Air Carriers, 57 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 92
(1962); Comment, Application of the "Home Port Doctrine" and the Due Process Clause
to State Taxation, 35 S. CAr. L. REv. 316 (1962).
115 A state sales tax on gasoline used by aircraft engaged in interstate commerce was
sustained by the Supreme Court. See Eastern Air Transp., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 285 US. 147 (1932).
Nearly all states have an aviation fuel tax. Letter from J.E. Mitchell, Jr., Executive
Director, Huntsville-Madison County Airport Authority, Ala., to the author, Nov. 6, 1972.
The Huntsvile-Madison Airport "generate[s] for the state approximately $100 thousand
annually [in aviation fuel taxes] but [the] return amounts to something considerably less
than 10%." Id.
In Michigan, however, a state tax on aviation fuel is the principal source of funds
provided by the Michigan Aeronautics Commission for local communities to use in airport
development. 1972 House Hearings 180 (Michigan Aeronautics Commission Position Paper).
116 "Congress will pass at least the head tax ban, if not the whole bill as vetoed."
Telephone conversation with J. Corbett, Vice President of Federal Affairs, Airport Opera-
tors Council International, Inc., Nov. 6, 1972.
This prediction has been partially realized. On February 5, 1978, the Senate approved
a measure (S. 88, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1978)) similar to the vetoed 1972 bill. See notes 9 &
10 and accompanying text supra. This bill provides for a ban on head taxes and an in-
crease in the federal share in airport development projects at all but the large hubs. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1978, at 61, col. 1.
117 In Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 825 U.S. 761 (1945), the Court said that
the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords
some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that
in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legisla-
ture, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of
a state and national interests.
Id. at 769.
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disputes concerning state taxation of facilities used in interstate com-
merce; however, they can deal with particular statutes only on a case-
by-case basis.118 The judiciary has no power to create a national taxa-
tion policy.' 19 Thus, it is appropriate for Congress to formulate an
integrated and uniform policy regulating state passenger service charges
and federal airport development programs.
In addition to the 1972 bill proposal, several other schemes have
been advanced for increasing the federal share in airport development
projects while banning the exaction of air passenger service charges.
The most progressive proposal calls for ninety percent federal contribu-
tion and ten percent airport sponsor matching funds. This is the
method used for financing the interstate highway system. 20 Another
alternative involves eighty percent federal participation and twenty
percent sponsor participation, with an increase of the federal air pas-
senger ticket tax from eight percent to ten percent.12' Under this plan,
forty percent of the ticket tax would be returned directly to the airport
from which it was collected, and would be used for capital improve-
ments or major maintenance requirements. 22 A third possible solu-
tion calls for seventy-five percent federal and twenty-five percent air-
118 Judicial inability to deal with the entire scope of the problem was recognized by
Mr. Justice Jackson:
It is, I know, difficult to judge and dangerous to foreclose claims of other states
that are not before us. That is the weakness of the judicial process in these tax
questions where the total problem that faces an industry reaches us only in in-
stallments.
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 307 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).
119 Judicial control of national commerce-unlike legislative regulations-must
from inherent limitations of the judicial process treat the subject by the hit-and-
miss method of deciding single local controversies upon evidence and information
limited by the narrow rules of litigation. Spasmodic and unrelated instances of
litigation cannot afford an adequate basis for the creation of integrated national
rules which alone can afford that full protection for interstate commerce intended
by the Constitution.
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 809 US. 176, 188-89 (1940) (Black, J., dissenting)
(Arkansas gasoline tax held unconstitutional).
Justice Black stressed that "in the exercise of its plenary constitutional control over
interstate commerce," only Congress can consider whether a tax "is consistent with the
best interests of our national economy," and "can also on the basis of full exploration of
the many aspects of a complicated problem devise a national policy fair alike to the
States and our Union. Diverse and interacting state laws may well have created avoidable
hardships .... But the remedy, if any is called for, we think is within the ample reach
of Congress." Id. at 189 (citations omitted).
120 1972 Senate Hearings 125 (statement of J. O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots
Association); id. at 210 (statement of H. Boyd, Jr., Airport Manager, Raleigh-Durham Air-
port Authority, N.C.).
121 Id. at 210 (statement of H. Boyd, Jr., Airport Manager, Raleigh-Durham Airport
Authority, N.C.).
122 Id.
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port sponsor participation in eligible airport development projects,
supplemented by federal contribution of eighty-two percent for safety
certification and security equipment, one hundred percent for land
acquisition for future airport development, and fifty percent for acqui-
sition, construction, or repair of public areas in terminal facilities.12
The 90:10 and the 80:20 ratio proposals are the most attractive alter-
natives for relieving the airport financial crisis; however, federal bud-
getary problems and airport sponsors' fear of federalization may pre-
clude these two solutions. With the 75:25 ratio proposal, head taxes
would remain necessary to satisfy airport needs.
CONCLUSION
The complexities of adequate airport financing suggest that Con-
gress conduct an in-depth study of the entire problem with a view to-
wards adopting a more comprehensive program which could include
federal regulation of local head taxes.
To eliminate the dangers inherent in the proliferation of varying
air passenger fees, Congress could formulate uniform standards, main-
taining the following safeguards: (1) charges, which must apply to in-
terstate and intrastate travelers alike, must operate only on the inci-
dence of enplanement, (2) charges must bear a reasonable relationship
to use of the facilities, (3) charges must be used only for airport and
airway purposes, such as acquisition, construction, operation, and main-
tenance costs, and (4) exemptions from charges must be uniform and
should include at least temporary layovers. Congress should re-examine
federal participation in the capital improvements eligible under the
1970 Act, and consider expanding federal assistance to include costs
of operation and maintenance, and additional capital improvements-
safety and security equipment, airport land acquisition, and con-
struction and maintenance of public areas in terminal buildings.
Prohibition of head taxes, with only moderate increases in federal aid,
is too simplistic a solution for the current crisis. It is only by welding
together features from various proposals that Congress will create a
viable program for development of the national air transportation
system.
Linda E. Laufer
123 This proposal is substantially the same as S. 3755, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), as
adopted by the Senate prior to the conference report in which it was modified into the
1972 bill. Large hub airports were to be funded on a 50:50 basis, rather than on a 75:25
basis.
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